Poststructuralism and Objective Structures

In discussing my understandings of Bourdieu's theories and their applicability to my own research into the literacy practices of mobile technologies, with my supervisor, I have been given cause to reflect on my self-positioning as a researcher.

I must comment that when I first read the term 'objective structures' in Bourdieu's Language and Symbolic Power (1991) it did catch my eye. A small splinter in the back of my brain seemed to suggest that there was something 'wrong' here, something amiss, something that did not seem to gel with the rest of my poststructural leanings. Indeed, the very idea of something being 'objective' in any way shape of form, seems highly problematic to me, similar to describing the ocean as blue, when we actually know that this is a perceptual trick of light. This continual reference to 'objective phenomena' seems to be spread throughout Bourdieu's work, underlining his structuralist perspective. However, it remains something that I find difficult to accept.

So how am I to resolve this apparant contradiction between my poststructural beliefs and Bourdieu's identification of 'objective structures'? Can they fit together, or do they destroy each other as matter and anti-matter would?

Objectivity, in all its apparent forms may appear to be a 'truth', but such is the danger when one looks at one's own culture from within. I had always considered 'objective truths' within the field of social activities to be constructions of hegemonic discourses: 'truths' that could be changed, but only by those with the appropriate cultural and symbolic capital. In reviewing literature in this area (of which there is a mountainous amount) I was drawn to the work of James Paul Gee on Discourse Analysis.

The two central concepts at the heart of Gee's model of discourse analysis are "situated meanings" and "cultural models." (1999). With reference to both these concepts, there is a continual dependence on situational context for meaning-making. Let me take each of these concepts in turn, discussing their implications for my approach in dealing with the 'objective structures' identified by Bourdieu.

Situated meanings are based on a "pattern-recognition" (Gee, 1999, 48-52) model of the mind. It is based on an understanding that meaning is not an objective reality, but rather something situated in actual practices and experiences: "...meaning is multiple, flexible, and tied to culture." (40) Further, "...meanings are situated in relationship to history and in relationship to other texts and voices." (41) Meaning-making is thus tied up continually with contextual factors determined by the 'cultural models' at work in any given situation.

This concept in fact has a good deal in common with Bourdieu's understanding of the way habitus works for individuals in social situations, across fields. Indeed, as Schirato and Yell point out, cultural context is an essential component of Bourdieu's theories: "...practice, or what people actually do, is constrained by, and develops as a response to, the rules and conventions of a culture." (Schirato & Yell, 2000, 1). Both are based on an understanding of the deployment of dispositions, or actions, in response to a contextualised meaning. Through Bourdieu we might configure this relation as being one about how activities are conducted in response to a particular field, where the individual deploys responses according to their habitus, which is augmented by the 'capital' they have access to in that particular concept. It is here where his concept of 'objective structures' comes into play, as a determining aspect of social relations that helps define the capital that one is able to realise in certain contexts. Part of the structure of 'symbolic violence' is the necessary importance of 'misrecognition'. In this process "...agents are subjected to forms of violence...but they do not perceive it that way; rather, their situation seems to them to be 'the natural order of things'." (Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002, 25). It seems therefore that 'symbolic violence' is the way in which 'objective structures' may be maintained and gain their 'objectivity' in the mind of individuals. Whether or not we can equate 'objective structures' with 'cultural models' is a difficult and complex question.

At it's simplest level, Gee describes "cultural models" as being like "videotapes in the mind" (1999, 60-61), though he admits that this metaphor should not be taken too literally or simplistically, the situation being far more complicated that the description suggests prima facie (On a side-note, should we now be speaking of DVDs in the mind, or MPEGs in the the mind, avoiding the connotations of linearity that this metaphor suggests and instead moving to one that suggests we can skip to scenes without having to fast-forward through all the irrelevant 'stuff'? A rethink of the metaphor to consider.). Whilst cultural models may appear to be 'objective', this is only a result of Bourdieu's concept of 'misrecognition'. The distinction must be made though that whilst Bourdieu uses the concept of 'objective structures' as if they were external influences on social practice (well that's the implication), for Gee, the concept of 'cultural models' is always contextual and always linked to local cultural contexts. Cultural models are not an external construction of a society, but rather, shared understandings, shared Discourses (with a capital D) of individuals with similarly inculcated habituses. 'Cultural models can become emblematic visions of an idealized, "normal," "typical" reality...' (Gee, 1999, 60) yet is must be kept in mind that this is not an objective reality, but rather the construction of shared Discourses across a society. Therefore, just as with individual habitus there is variation, "Cultural models are also variable, differing across different cultural groups, including different cultural groups in a society speaking the same language. They change with time and other changes in society, as well as with new experience." (60)

Suggesting an alternative to Bourdieu's notion of 'objective structures' in order to reframe his theories in a more poststructural light, is a difficult, and no doubt, controversial move; though it is a necessary one I think. In his sociological work Bourdieu goes to great pains to be flexible, to lay open rules to breaches and difference. Therefore whilst he may say that individual interest is generally pursued at the unconscious or pre-conscious level, he still does not rule out conscious pursuit of 'interest': "There is, however, ambiguity in Bourdieu's work.... At times he admits conscious strategizing while at other times he insists on the unconscious character of interest calculation....Bourdieu is willing to recognize degrees of awareness of the interested character of some forms of action...." (Swartz, 1997, 70). It is difficult therefore to accept the place of 'objectivity', of strict certainty, within his theory.

I seek to move beyond any absolute certainty in the reality of social practices, to a more fluid understanding of social relations caught up in symbolic systems of power, 'cultural models', or 'Discourses'. As society and culture seems to move and change so rapidly - the massive impact of mobile technologies on social life is a dramatic demonstration of rapid change - we need a sociological understanding that is capable of accounting for these rapid changes, without getting caught up by principles of objectivity. I do not see this as leaving me at the mercy of unresolved and rampant subjectivism either: concepts such as Gee's 'cultural models' and the manner in which capital is continually reproduced as 'the natural' through Bourdieu's concept of 'symbolic violence', point to understandings of everyday life and the literacies involved therein, that can account for stability, as well as change.


References

Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gee, J.P. (1999). An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method. London and New York: Routledge.

Schirato, T. & Yell, S. (2000). Communication and Cultural Literacy: An Introduction (2nd ed.). St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Swartz, D. (1997). Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Webb, J., Schirato, T. & Danaher, G. (2002). Understanding Bourdieu. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Autoethnography and Mobile Technology Research

The following comments primarily (prima facie) relate to my own experience of ethnographic, quantitative studies. Whilst the comments may be applicable to other contexts, I make no claims for their generalisability as such.

A curious concern has emerged as my research continues to progress and evolve, concerning the distance between the researcher and the researched. By the researched I don't simply refer to people either, but the general subject of engagement as well. Of course, as a poststructuralist, I have always acknowledged the inherent impossibility of ever achieving strict objectivity in relation to conducting research.

The impossibility of any researcher ever being entirely separated from their topic of research, is linked to my anti-positivistic and existential beliefs, but also to my empirical experience in conducting research. Not only is the researcher ever-present during the research phase (when dealing with others for instance), raising the possibility of influencing data outcomes through their very presence, but this elucidation of the physical presence points to an even more pervasive ontological status for the researcher within their field of study. A research project denotes a 'constructed' field of engagement (perhaps not as overtly when a 'grounded theory' approach to 'discovery' is employed) that in some ways precludes possible data, or at the very least, interpretative schemas for explaining the data. In essence, because research is research, it unavoidably involves the 'tainted' perspective of the researcher; however much they may strive to study 'naturalistic' situations, the frame for the data is a constructed, artificial one, implied by the researcher's persona.

It is here, at the point where I acknowledge that yes, a researcher is a person, that I come to a second point concerning the impossibility of ever separating the researcher from the researched; the researcher as a human being with the possibility of shared experiences with the subjects of research. If the researcher has personal experience in the actual topic of investigation, how, and to what extent is this analytically useful?

Particularly with ethnographic studies, there is an extent to which the researchers and their subjects of research have shared experiences, frequently being from the same society, if not culture. This means that the 'expert' brings with them to the study their own preconceptions, experiences and perspectives; their own habitus if you will. In such as case, the importance of the researchers own experience becomes not just a side-line or aspect of research to be explained away theoretically (This project is postmodern, so doesn't ascribe to objective, positivistic beliefs), but an important piece of research data in itself.

In studying mobile technologies and their use among young people, I have had numerous cause to reflect on my own use of these technologies. Since these technologies - taking mobile phones as the quintessential example - have become so ubiquitous, it seems the case that everyone in Australian society can provide possible data from their own experiences (phone owner or not) concerning how these devices are used in everyday practice. Does this mean that I, as the central researcher, should not only be avoiding any facade of objectivity, but rather, tend towards the other extreme and expose my own mobile technology behaviours as a component of data? Perhaps, but as always with research, there is a need to find theoretical support for such a position. I found such an approach in the controversial field of 'autoethnography'.

Autoethnography, or the examination of myself as a subject of my own research, could offer some interesting insights and perspectives for my work. The line between digital 'natives' and 'immigrants' as put forward by Prensky (2001) may provide a point of focus for examining literate practices around these devices. In deploying Bourdieu's concept of habitus (1977; 1980; 1991) as a means to understanding how individuals function in everyday practice, I am given cause to reflect on the differences regarding inculcation of the habitus for myself, compared to the youth at the centre of my study. How the nature of inculcation effects dispositions towards deploying certain literacy practices associated with mobile technologies, as a form of cultural capital, and how effective this is, may be beyond the scope of this project. A detailed comparison of the researcher's habitus with regard to the use of mobile technologies, with a students, may also be beyond the scope of this project, but should this preclude the personal experiences of the researcher from being included as data? I suppose I will find this out as I delve into the field of youth mobile technologies in an effort to understand how their habitus works through the deployment of various types of 'semiotic capital' (as a branch of cultural and symbolic capital) (Carrington & Luke, 1997, 102).

Sure, autoethnography fits with my own poststructuralist beliefs an approaches in the sense that "...autoethnography in sociology has been championed predominantly by interdisciplinary symbolic interactionists with postmodern or poststructural sensitivities...." (Anderson, 2006, 373) However, as has been suggested, the difficulty is in maintaining the focus on students' experiences in a analytical manner. One of the dangers of autoethnography, as pointed out by Anderson, is in it becoming purely evocative we may "...fail to adequately engage with others in the field." (386) A central concern of my research - one of the catalysts for its birth - was the absence of authentic student voices in the research. I am fully aware of my digital immigrant status, as I print out articles off the computer to read in hard-copy, struggle to type and SMS without looking whilst driving, and generally try to get my mind around the ever-expanding realm of digital choice now available anywhere, anytime. In an effort to resist narcissistic writing, Anderson (2006) proposes a useful structure for 'Analytic Autoethnography' which may prove useful.

Anderson (2006) offers a more rigorous framework, as an alternative to 'evocative autoethnography', for this research methodology in his 'Analytic Autoethnography' model. This AA model (as Vryan terms it, 2006) has five key features:

1. complete member researcher (CMR) status
2. analytic reflexivity
3. narrative visibility of the researcher's self
4. dialogue with informants beyond the self
5. commitment to theoretical analysis. (Anderson, 2006, 378)

In addressing each of these points briefly: it is difficult to imagine how a researcher in the field of mobile technologies would not meet CMR status. With mobile phones being so ubiquitous and widespread, it is difficult nowadays to conceive of someone who has no experience living in a society with these devices. Analytic reflexivity would of course occur in places like this blog, where I continually examine myself as a mobile technology user: to carry this same sort of discourse over to more rigorous work, would be to make myself visible within the narrative of research (point 3). The last two points link very much with my own philosophy, not just about teaching and learning, but research itself, in that I have a commitment to understanding the voices of students in a rigorous manner (not simply in an evocative or descriptive fashion). In deploying the concepts of habitus and cultural capital in relation to students I am seeking a deeper theoretical understanding of informants beyond myself. No doubt this model of autoethnography has its own problems (as pointed out by Charmez, 2006 and Vryan, 2006), but it is at least a start in justifying a possible overt presence 0f the researchers within the project. In essence, I want to make sure that if my own experiences are useful for the research in some way, that it is used in a rigorous fashion, avoiding the use of personal experience for simple ego-gratification.

Whilst Vryan (2006) makes some forceful arguments for the importance of 'evocative autoethnography' - which he sees as expanding the potential of this field of study, rather than "...unnecessarily constrain[ing]..." (405) it as he feels Anderson has done - I can see the limitations of an evocative approach for my own work. Sure it might be interesting to dissect the cogs of elation/frustration as this digital immigrant seeks to continually integrate mobile technologies into his life, but the scope is too narrow for my liking. I can of course acknowledge and importance for 'evocative ethnography' in research generally, though in my case, it does not fully suit.

In my examination of students literate habitus with regard to mobile technologies, I am searching for that vein of rigor, or abstraction. In deploying Bourdieu's concept of habitus (1977; 1980; 1991) I am seeking to explain everyday practices in terms of sociocultural trends specific to Australia. Whilst evocative forms of writing and analysis may have a place in examining the emotional realm of mobile technology, may be relevant to the concept of habitus, this form of writing seems unable to reach the level of description and possible generalisablity that a more analytically based study would.

After all this wondering, I am still not sure how my own experiences with mobile technologies should fit within the scope of my work. I want to focus on student/youth experiences, but also find myself continually reflecting on my own experiences. I find it impossible to believe that I will be able to keep my own experiences out of the discussion - there are those poststructural beliefs again - but at least there are some models of autoethnography that offer a structured methodology to work from.

If anyone else knows of any autoethnographic work that may be of use, please suggest it through the comments section.

References

Anderson, L. (2006). Analytic Autoethnography. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35(4), 373-395.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1980). The logic of practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Carrington, V. & Luke, A. (1997). Literacy and Bourdieu's Sociological Theory: A Reframing. Language and Education, 11(2), 96-112.
Charmaz, K. (2006). The Power of Names. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35(4), 396-399.
Prensky, M. (2001). Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants. On the Horizon, 9(5), 1-2.
Vryan, K. D. (2006). Expanding Analytic Autoethnography and Enhancing Its Potential. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35(4), 405-409.