Bourdieu's Habitus and Mobile Technologies

Upon further reflection, the nature of capital as discussed in the writing below needs further clarification - it is at times a vague and (I apologise) misused term. A discussion on the nature of capital will follow at a later time.

Mobile technologies are changing the nature of literacy practices among individuals at an everyday level in highly noticeable ways. Apart from the fact that mobile phones have become so ubiquitous, that you can be virtually guaranteed to see them in use on public transport, the convergence of technological features in such devices, is forcing a rethink of what exactly these devices are and the myriad of ways they may change the way we live our everyday lives. As I am seeking an understanding of literacy practices within the context of everyday social life, it seems only logical to place this within a wider theory of everyday practices. I had come across the work of Pierre Bourdieu during my wanderings through literature concerning literacy and new technologies; his concept of 'habitus' was something that immediately appealed to my poststructural sensibilities (despite a whiff of determinism).

Prima facie I found Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' to be a breath of fresh air - logical, practical and based in the messy activities of everyday life (not in the archives of academia). It seemed logical to talk about individuals in terms of their dispositions towards everyday experiences. In order to explain this concept, I would like to start with a rather simplified explaination: "...habitus can be viewed as a complex internalised core from which everyday experiences emanate. It is the source of day to day practices." (Reay, 1995, 357) In examining mobile technology practices as they pertain to literacy events (broadly defined and not limited to linguistic phenomena) in everyday life, it is essential to understand the individual as a member of a specific sociocultural environment (in this case Australia), but as a self-determining individual nontheless. The concept of habitus allows us to conduct such an examination (despite claims that we can only do so indirectly).

In seeking to connect Bourdieu's complex concept of habitus with mobile phone practices, it was first necessary to define the general qualities of this term. Diane Reay breaks this concept down into what she sees as the "four main aspects of habitus" (1995, 353):

• Habitus as Embodiment;
• Habitus and Agency;
• Compilation of Collective and Individual Trajectories;
• Complex Interplay between Past and Present. (1995)

Let me unpack these themes with specific relation to mobile technologies and their impact on habitus, and the subsequent realisation of different forms of capital.

Bourdieu's acknowledgement of habitus' embodiment through bodily hexis demonstrates how individuals are not only in a social world, but the social world is incribed in/on their body. As with all dispositions within the habitus, this embodiment occurs through the process of inculcation: "The child imitates not 'models' but other people's actions. Bodily hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of patterns of postures that is both individual and systemic...." (Bourdieu, 1977, 87) In this way, one's very physical presence in society, the embodiment of one's habitus (postures, gestures, ways of standing, speaking, walking) can be realised as different forms of cultural capital (at both a social and symbolic level). Consider how the mobile phone, as a physical object carried almost everywhere by people who own them (after all, that is the point of a mobile technology), functions as an embodiment of a particular type of habitus, with access to different types of capital than those people without one of these devices. The very presence of the device seems to say: "I am connected...I can be contacted, anywhere, anytime." As the embodied nature of habitus inscribed through inculcation, it may be the case that young people, who have grown up with these technologies as ubiquitous, take for granted the presence of these devices, and instead look for other features of these technologies as markers of 'distinction' with regard to cultural capital. Put another way, as the mobile phone increasingly becomes "...not only a tool to 'talk' but also...a means to communicate symbolically about oneself..." (Katz & Sugiyama, 2006, 324) the very physicallity of the device can be used as 'fashion' to as a way of expressing individual and/or collective identity. Depending on sociocultural inculcation, different features of the mobile device (appearance, functionallity, ease of use) may be weighted differently as cultural capital. Therefore, the mobile phone, as a part of bodily hexis, is inscribed as a part of habitus, for the very use (or absence of use) of a specific mobile device - and use in specific ways - realises different levels of cultural capital. It is doubtful, for instance, that a student with a 10-year old second-hand phone, would gain much cultural capital in a group of peers who valued up-to-date and the most modern model phone. In this way, embodied habitus can be linked to class and economic prevlidge realised as cultural capital. The connection between mobile technologies embodied in the habitus is no doubt far more complex that this short discussion suggests, but I want to move onto a discussion of habitus and agency.

The relationship between agency and structure is linked to the fact that "Choice is at the heart of habitus...but at the same time the choices inscribed in the habitus are very clearly limited." (Reay, 1995, 355) The agency of habitus is limited by a number of structuring factors, including fields, inculcation and various types of capital. It is this dialectic interaction between individual agency and structures which determine and restrict choice; capital is realised through the 'aptness' of a disposition for a specific context. There has been a good deal of criticism that Bourdieu's concept of habitus, as unconscious dispositions which drive our choices without us being aware of them, is too deterministic. This idea, that individual agency is restricted by factors beyond our control, ignores the fact that Bourdieu explicitly states that: "habitus goes hand in hand with vagueness and indeterminacy." (Bourdieu cited in Reay, 1995, 355) There is also Bourdieu's acknowledgement that habitus can indeed be deployed consciously: "It is, of course, never ruled out that the responses of the habitus may be accompanied by a strategic calculation tending to perform in a conscious mode the operation that the habitus performs quite differently..." (Bourdieu, 1980, 53). Whilst there may not be limitless choice incribed in the habitus, accusations that it is overly deterministic fail to take account of the flexibility and vagueness of this term. As Adams points out in attempting to resolve respective accusations of determinism and voluntarism levelled against the concepts of habitus and reflexivity, "disjunction between habitus and field has become the norm." (2006, 520) As such, reflexivity becomes incorporated into the habitus, historicizing Bourdieu's analysis in that we have moved beyond the stability of modernity that shaped his earlier analyses: nowadays, in times of constant change - or times of 'instablitity' as Kress might call it (2000) - "reflexivity has become a general capability reflecting social change." Thus, although objective structures of society (fields) may limit the agency of individuals, due to their habitus, there is a degree of movement and change still available (despite inculcation of the habitus). For elaboration, let us consider the situation surrounding mobile technologies: whilst 'digital natives' (Prensky, 2001) may have grown up with mobile technologies, meaning that individual agency surrounding their use in objective structures, generally results in the realisation of positive cultural capital, 'digital immigrants' have also become part of this mobile generation. The current use of mLearning in corporate environments (Metcalf, 2006), is testament to the fact that even those individuals for whom the use of mobile technology is not intimately inscribed and embodied in their habitus (through inculcation) are able to develop agency using these devices in objective structures. Of course, this is predicated upon a workplace field that supports such communication behaviours. In our schools for instance, this is not the situation. More often than not, mobile technologies are seen as a distraction to learning and the objective structure of the educational institution reduces the agency of young people to use such devices to develop cultural or symbolic capital for this field. There are other situations where the use of mobile technologies for literacy events is restricted by structures beyond the habitus, either through formal regulations (the illegallity of using a mobile phone whilst driving a car for instance) of social restrictions (speaking about a delicate private matter whilst on a crowded train for instance). As can be seen, the agency of an individual in accordance with their dispositions (habitus) is restricted for mobile technologies by various structures, as with any other form of social behaviour. Once again, this is by no means an exhaustive examination of this complex area; rather a starting point for further discussion and debate.

The nature of a habitus is linked to the nature of human beings: individuals who function in accordance with their own needs and desires (individual trajectories), which are inculcated by their experience of a particular sociocultural context, and so, to an extent, shared with the rest of human kind, or at least with other people in their shared social/cultural context. "A person's individual history is: constitutive of habitus but so also is the whole collective history of family and class that the individual is a member of." (Reay, 1995, 355) This is the essence of habitus being both a collective and individual phenomenon. This allows us to speak of habitus in terms of both cultural/social dispositions (ingrained in the habitus through inculcation), but also in terms of individual habitus (including all the quirks and variations of individuallity). But how is this relationship between the collective and the individual configured? If our habitus is always the product of our inculcation in a specific sociocultural context, how do we account for individual/personal style? Bourdieu himself suggests that: '...each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all the other group or class habitus ... "Personal" style...is never more than a deviation in relation to the style of a period or class so that it relates back to the common style not only by its conformity...but also by the difference which makes the whole "manner".' (1977, 86). Therefore, if we think of habitus as a set of guiding principles by which we live our social lives, we may consider that some of those principles are inculcated by the environment in which we live and develop, but equally, other principles are influence by individual dispositions, experiences and attitudes (individual trajectories). I would also contend that we leave room for biological imperatives as well. As laid out by Roos and Rotkirch (2003), there is room to take account of a 'evolutionary sociology' in respect to habitus. They agree with Bourdieu's concept of habitus, but urge that additional concerns be taken into account:

1. "The fact that lots of our bodily functions and emotions are based on evolved characteristics
2. The fact that the way in which habitus-based actions (instincts) function and work back in the society are to some extent biologically bounded and determined." (5)

Whilst these observations are not extensively explained in their work, the idea that being a biological entity plays a part in individual dispositions seems like common sense. Imperatives such as hunger, fear, wanting to go to the toilet, sweating, etc., all point to a biologic aspect of habitus. This is in some way encouraging, in the realisation that there is some common aspects to habitus, despite inculcation. Whether or not the need to communicate is an evolutionary or inculcated disposition of the habitus is an area that still needs investigation. If it is indeed an evolutionary need, then the rapid uptake and highly-frequent use of mobile technologies (particulary mobile phones) by 'digital natives' (Prensky, 2001) takes on a biologic dimension. Aside from that, inculcation has still clearly played a role in dispositions towards mobile technologies, as despite the positive attitute towards these devices expressed through cultural discourses (particularly the media), painting a positive picture of these devices, it has generally been the younger generations that have taken up these technologies as a ubiquitous part of their lives, or put another way, as an essential part of their habitus. Indeed, there is an evolving area of research exploring how important mobile technologies are becoming in the lives of young people, with comments such as: "'We often have a panic situation when the battery runs down' or 'I'd feel really, really lost without my phone now'." (Vincent, 2005, 120) becoming more and more common. As such, habitus at both a collective and individual level is becoming more and more integrated with the use of mobile technologies. We no longer phone a place, but a person, when we call a mobile phone. We don't stick rigidly to schedules, but can call from anywhere, anytime (in an ideal world) to renegotiate appointment times. Mobile technologies are thus changing dispositions, even amongst 'digital immigrants'. (Prensky, 2001)

The last aspect of habitus that Reay (1995) illuminates is the complex interplay between past and present in the habitus. Habitus, through the process of inculcation, is a product of individual history, lived through specific social and cultural conditionings. Thus, habitus, while being used in 'the present', is always connected to it's collective and individual history. It is this continual presence of the past in the habitus that determines our dispositions in the present, not an anticipation of the future as Bourdieu puts it: "...they [dispositions] are determined by the past conditions of production of their principle of production, that is, by the already realized outcome of identical or interchangeable past practices...." (1980, 61) This is why, in unfamiliar situations, in which an individual has no past experiences to fall back on "...the objective chances...are negatively sanctioned because the environment they actually encounter is too different form the one to which they are objectively adjusted." (62) Consider having to ask for a place to stay in a country where you do not speak the language or understand the culture. However, the result of this disjunction is not a paralysis of habitus - dispositions are not so fixed as to be immovable or unchangeable. Rather "...although the habitus is a product of early childhood experience...it is continually modified by individuals' encounters with the outside world." (Reay, 1995, 356) The understanding that needs to be gleaned about habitus in this respect is that whilst it is "inevitably reflective of the social context in which ...[it was] acquired..." (357) every experience shapes and reshapes dispositions. Mobile technologies, and their rapid dissemination and use throughout society are a prime example of this, especially with regard to their take-up by 'digital immigrants' (Prensky, 2001). Those students who have grown up with the inculcation of mobile technologies into their habitus as ubiquitous, inevitably deal with the devices in a more effective manner. This has resulted in a curious disjunction arising in contemporary classrooms, where quite often students are more digitally competent and savvy than their teachers (Leech, 2006). This is due to the fact that their dispositions are driven by a past rich in these technologies, where very often, the habitus of a teacher is less rich in terms of 'digital experience'. Mobile technologies then, and the ability to realise cultural capital through their use in the present, is driven by past experience and exposure to such dispositions. One would only expect dispostions amongst young people towards the use of digital technologies to increase with the release of phones specifically designed for children (featuring parent-programmed numbers and controlled content). Put simply, when you grow up in a world where mobile devices are ubiquitous, then dispositions towards their use are more ingrained and 'natural'. People with such habitus' will no doubt find it easier, more 'normal', to realise cultural capital through their use.

I am essentially concerned here with the way in which mobile literacy practices, as deployed in accordance with a particular Australian youth habitus, across indeterminate fields, are realized as different forms and levels of cultural capital. The role of habitus in this process is a central one, where mobile technologies act as altering principles on individual dispositions during everyday social interactions.

So what can we say at this stage about habitus where mobile technology is concerned? At first the distinction must be made that when we are talking about mobile technologies and their use in the everyday lives of people, we are concerned with the deployment of information and communication practices. In this sense, this research is tied up with the power relationships inhenrent in the production and reproductions of 'legitimate language'. (Bourdieu, 1991) Therefore, the use of mobile technologies for communicative practices realises a form of cultural capital that is not really valued in the educational establishment. Thus, we get reactive and prohibition measures to address the 'intrusion' of these handheld devices into classrooms. This is also the root of claims that SMS language is devaluing authentic and legitimate language. It must be remembered that such debates are predicated on differentiated forms of cultural capital concerning language.

However, once we move beyond this politically charged debate, and examine the agency that can be realised by the habitus through the use of mobile technologies, the situation becomes even more complicated. Deciding which semiotic resources to deploy in relation to a literacy event, is a choice between multiple modes of meaning-making. Dispositions inculcated in the habitus with regard to such activities are no doubt different for the 'digital natives' than for the 'immigrants'. (Prensky, 2001) Whether, in a particular situation, one should send an SMS, make a phone call, send an email or MMS, have as much to do with habitus, with one's individual historic trajectory, as with regard to 'access'. Whilst the limitations of a 'virtual field' enforced by a particular model mobile phone, network or bandwidth restrictions, or even access to a mobile device of some kind, help to determine the literacy event that can take place, the dispositions of an individual in particular contexts, play an essential role as to what actions an individual will take. Dispositions towards answering a ringing phone in a movie theatre have more to do with habitus (both at an individual and cultural level) than whether that phone was on 'silent' or not.

References

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Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Prensky, M. (2001). "Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants." On the Horizon, 9(5), 1-2.

Reay, D. (1995). 'They Employ Cleaners to Do That': Habitus in the Primary Classroom. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 16(3), 353-371.

Reay, D. (2004). 'It's all becoming a habitus': beyond the habitual use of habitus in educational research. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 25(4), 431-444.

Roos, J. P. & Rotkirch, A. (2003, Sept 23-28). Habitus, Nature or Nurture? Towards a paradigm of evolutionary sociology. European Sociological Association Conference, Murcia.

Shay, S. B. (2004). The Assessment of Complex Performance: A Socially Situated Interpretive Act. Harvard Educational Review, 74(3), 307-329.

Vincent, J. (2005). Emotional Attachment and Mobile Phones. In Glotz, P., Bertschi, S. & Locke, C. (Eds.), Thumb Culture: The Meaning of Mobile Phones for Society (pp. 117-122). London: Transaction Publishers.